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BOOK REVIEWS 
An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, by 
John Hick. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989. Pp. xv and 
412. Cloth, $35.00. 
WILLIAM WAINWRIGHT, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. 
Hick's Gifford lectures bring together his reflections on religious epistemol-
ogy and religious pluralism. Their publication provides an excellent oppor-
tunity for reassessing the thought of a philosopher who has made major 
contributions to the discussion of both issues. 
Part One contends that "the great world faiths" affirm that the possibility 
of salvation/liberation "is grounded in reality." Part Two argues that "the 
universe is religiously ambiguous in that it is possible to interpret it...both 
religiously and naturalistically." (12) 
Part Three is epistemological. Hick rehearses his case for claiming that "all 
conscious experiencing is experiencing-as," and that there are three primary 
"levels of interpretation ... physical, ethical and religious." Our cognitive free-
dom is greatest at the third level. "It is rationally appropriate," however, "for 
those who experience their life in relation to the transcendent to trust their 
own experience, together with that of the stream of religious life in which 
they participate." (12-13) 
Part Four raises the question of religious pluralism. Hick distinguishes 
between the "Real-in-itself and the Real as humanly thought and experi-
enced," and argues that all "experience of the transcendent is structured either 
by the concept of deity ... or by the concept of the absolute." These in tum are 
"schematized in actual human experience" to produce the diversity of "divine 
personae" and "metaphysical impersonae." "The function of religion in each 
case," however, is to transform "human existence from self-centredness to 
Reality-centredness." (14) 
The fifth and final part is criteriological. Hick argues that "the basic crite-
rion is soteriological; and the salvific transformation is most readily observed 
by its moral fruits, which can be identified by means of the ethical ideal, 
common to all the great traditions of agape/karuna (love/compassion)." (14) 
When we apply this criterion, however, we find that the major religions are 
equally successful in meeting it. There are no "impartial grounds," then, for 
ranking one religion more highly than another. (3) 
This is a thoughtful and stimulating book. It is also problematic. I will 
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attempt to show this by discussing three central ideas-the world's religious 
ambiguity, The Real-an- sich, and the "common ideal." 
1. Hick believes that the universe is religiously ambiguous because "it is 
capable from our present human vantage point of being thought and experi-
enced in both religious and naturalistic ways." (73) The case for this is "made 
by showing the inconclusiveness of the various philosophical arguments on 
both sides." (75) 
The world is genuinely ambiguous only if religious and naturalistic inter-
pretations are equally plausible. Hick shows that the cases for both religious 
and naturalistic interpretations of the facts aren't fulIy conclusive and that 
other interpretations are possible. It doesn't follow that religious interpreta-
tions aren't more plausible than their rivals. 
Why think that they aren't? Hick concedes that the theistic evidences "can 
reasonably be said to point towards rather than away from a theistic world-
view." (122f) Other evidence, however, "can reasonably be said to point away 
from such a conclusion" (123) and there is no objective way of weighing the 
comparative force of the competing considerations. Hick's response to those 
who find a religious or naturalistic interpretation more plausible is that our 
assessments of the evidence's weight are "arbitrary and sUbjective." (123) 
Why should we believe this? Presumably because there are no grounds for a 
religious or naturalistic interpretation which all informed and rational people 
find compelling; no agreed upon standards on the basis of which one could 
say that the case for one interpretation is stronger than the case for the other. 
But Hick's ambiguity thesis is only partly based on his assessment of the 
standard proofs and his implicit equation of objectivity with what would be 
agreed upon by informed and rational people. It is also rooted in his "Kant-
ianism." Hick believes that aJI experiencing is "experiencing-as." The world 
as experienced is suffused with the meanings we have contributed to it-
physical, ethical, and religious. 
Given reality's structure and "the basic 'aim' of surviving and flourishing 
as a living organism" (139), we are more or less compelled to ascribe the 
physical meanings we do. Our cognitive freedom is minimal. We also have 
a basic need "for that mutuality which is of the essence of personal well-
being." It is thus "natural" that we should interpret others as persons, and 
accept the moral claims which this recognition imposes upon us. (147) Our 
cognitive freedom is greater in this case, however, because we can refuse to 
recognize some individuals as persons and can evade unwelcome moral 
claims. At the religious level, our cognitive freedom is even greater. 
So what does the world's religious ambiguity consist in? The difficulty of 
repelling skeptical challenges to common sense in a non-question begging 
way suggests that-at the purely intellectual level-the world's physical and 
moral ambiguity is nearly as great as its religious ambiguity. Of course most 
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of us believe that the case for the physical and ethical interpretations of the 
facts is stronger than the case against them. But isn't the fact that we are 
more impressed by the arguments on one side of the issue an expression of 
a strong disposition to construct the world in a certain way? And don't we 
also have a need to interpret the world religiously? The "virtual universality 
throughout human life of ideas and practices that are recognizably religious" 
(21) suggests that we do. 
The situation is this. If sound objective reasons are restricted to those which 
would be recognized as such by all informed and rational people, there are 
no purely intellectual grounds for asserting that the world's religious ambi-
guity is greater than its moral or physical ambiguity. The appearance of 
greater ambiguity is rooted in the fact that our need to interpret the world 
religiously is weaker (or not as strongly felt). Its greater ambiguity, in other 
worlds, isn't so much the result of how things objectively are (as Hick seems 
to suggest) but of how we are subjectively constituted. Why, then, should 
those whose need to construct the world religiously is stronger (and hence 
find the case for religious belief more plausible) be more impressed by the 
world's religious ambiguity than others are by its physical or ethical ambiv-
alence? 
Hick apparently thinks they shouldn't. It is rational to trust that the way 
things clearly seem to us is the way they are. Although "we cannot prove the 
existence of an external world," it is nonetheless reasonable to act "on the 
assumption that we inhabit the world that is apparently disclosed to us by our 
senses." (213) Those who find their religious experiences compelling are also 
entitled to trust them. Their "subjectively firm" religious beliefs are rationally 
justified. 
I am not sure that this is consistent with Hick's insistence that, from an 
objective point of view, the case for religion is neither more nor less compel-
ling than the case for naturalism-that there is evidence for both views and 
no standards for weighing it. 
It sounds odd to say that the world is physically ambiguous-that there is 
no objective reason for interpreting our experience as revealing a world of 
independent objects. Why? (1) Our experience seems to present us with such 
a world, (2) there are no compelling reasons for thinking that things aren't 
the way they seem, and (3) we have a natural disposition to believe in the 
reality of a world of independent physical objects. 
On the other hand, it doesn't sound odd to speak of the world as religiously 
ambiguous. (1) Most religious experiences aren't as compelling as ordinary 
perceptual experiences, and some people have no religious experience of any 
kind. (2) The only "objective" reason for thinking that there isn't a world of 
independent physical objects is the failure of attempts to prove there is. There 
appears to be positive evidence, however, of the Real's non-existence (viz., 
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evil). (3) The disposition to believe is weaker in this case, or more easily 
stifled. Because of these differences talk of a risk or wager is strained in the 
first case but not in the second. 
Suppose now that our perceptual experiences were more infrequent and 
less compelling, and that fewer people had them. Suppose that there was also 
some prima facie evidence for the non-existence of independent physical 
objects and that, objectively speaking this evidence was no less compelling 
than the evidence for their existence. Certainty would be unwarranted. Even 
those whose perceptual experiences are more vivid and compelling should 
entertain real doubts. Those with less impressive experiences should be even 
more distrustful. It may be rational to rely on one's experiences in these 
circumstances. Robust confidence seems out of order. The same considera-
tions apply, mutatis mutandis, to our religious situation. If the world is as 
ambiguous as Hick believes, "subjectively firm belief' (159) isn't rationally 
appropriate. 
2. Hick believes that we can "reasonably claim that our own form of 
religious experience .. .is veridical." (235) Because there are no relevant dif-
ferences between our form of religious experience and those embedded in 
other traditions, we must assign them the same validity. However, the phe-
nomenological objects of the various forms of religious experience are dif-
ferent. To preserve these experiences' validity, we must postulate the 
Real-in-itself of which the various divine personae and impersonae are phe-
nomenal manifestations. 
Hick's Kantianism seems problematic. We can only ascribe "formal prop-
erties" to the Real-an-sich. We can say, for example, that the Real has the 
property of "being a referent of a term" or "being such that our substantial 
characterizations do not apply." We cannot ascribe "substantial properties" 
to it "such as 'being good,' 'being powerful', 'having knowledge'," and so 
on. (239) 
I am not sure that this is consistent with other things Hick says. (1) Hick 
believes we veridically experience the Real. But "x veridically experiences 
y" entails "y causally acts upon x." We must therefore ascribe causal activity 
to the Real-an-sich. Causal activity, however, is a substantial concept. (2) 
Hick thinks that "these two very different ways of conceiving and experienc-
ing the Real, as personal and non-personal, is perhaps a complementarity 
analogous ... to that between the two ways of conceiving and registering light, 
namely as waves and as particles." (245) Suppose that it is. That light some-
times "appears to behave like a shower of particles," and at others "like a 
succession of waves" surely tells us something substantive about light itself. 
To know that a thing behaves in only some of the logically possible ways a 
thing can behave is to know something substantive about it and not just about 
its modes or manifestations. Consider now the divine personae. The major 
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theistic traditions typically experience the Real as powerful and intelligent-
not as weak and foolish. The divine impersonae are never experienced as 
powerless or defective. The traditions all experience the divine phenomena 
as good and bliss-bestowing. The Real-an-sich does not, in other words, 
veridically manifest itself in every logically possible way. Why doesn't this 
tell us something substantive about it? (3) Suppose that the Real is veridically 
experienced as P. Two theses are possible. According to the first, P can't be 
attributed to the Real-as-such if it is also possible to veridically experience 
it as non-Po According to the second, no substantive properties can be attrib-
uted to the Real. Hick seems to endorse the latter. He says, for example, that 
the Real "cannot be said to be one or many, person or thing, good or evil, 
purposive or non-purposive." (246, my emphasis). The stronger thesis isn't 
sufficiently motivated. It also leads to unacceptable consequences. 
We were forced to postulate a divine ding-an-sich because the divine phe-
nomena are inconsistent. That the ultimate can be veridically experienced as 
personal and non-personal, for example, suggests that the Real-in-itself is 
neither. But while Hick thinks the Real is veridically experienced as empti-
ness and also as a righteous will, he doesn't suggest that it is veridically 
experienced as evil. Why, then, can't the substantive concept goodness be 
ascribed to it? 
Suppose, however, that formal concepts alone can be applied to the ReaI-
in-itself. Why should we think that "the 'truthfulness' of each tradition is 
shown by its soteriological effectiveness" (248)? Hick's discussion of myth 
provides an answer. Most distinctively Christian or Buddhist beliefs about 
God or emptiness are mythological. They are true if they evoke appropriate 
dispositional attitudes to the Real. How do we determine that they do? Given 
that the various divine personae and impersonae "are indeed manifestations 
of the ultimately Real, an appropriate human response to anyone of them 
will also be an appropriate response to the Real." (350) If, for example, our 
responses would be appropriate to God if there literally were such a being, 
they will be appropriate to the Real. 
I don't think this will do. Hick's argument seems to hinge on the following 
claim. "If an experience of x is a veridical experience of y, an appropriate 
response to x is also an appropriate response to y." This claim is ambiguous, 
it might mean "If a person is veridically experiencing y as x, then an appro-
priate response to x is an appropriate response to y." Or it might mean "If a 
person who is experiencing y as x is really experiencing y, then an appropriate 
response to x is an appropriate response to y." The latter is false. If I delu-
sively experience our vacuum cleaner as a living creature, I may really be 
experiencing our vacuum cleaner. But feelings, attitudes and behavior which 
are appropriate responses to an animated machine aren't appropriate re-
sponses to our vacuum cleaner. To be true, Hick's claim must be interpreted 
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in its first sense. Yet this won't do either. If y is to be veridically experienced 
as x, x must surely bear some likeness or analogy to y. On Hick's view, it 
can't. Substantive concepts can't be applied to the Real-an-sich in a literal 
sense. But neither can they be applied analogically. (Analogical predicates 
apply to the divine personae and impersonae. [See page 351.]) When our 
language about the Real is emptied of all but formal content, no basis is left 
for saying that the Real is verdically experienced as one thing rather than 
another and hence for saying that one response to it is more appropriate than 
another. 
3. Committing oneself in faith to Christ, transcendence of the ego to attain 
Nirvana, and so on, "are variations within different conceptual schemes" on 
a common theme; "the transformation of human existence from self-centred-
ness to Reality-centredness" is the same. (36) Since "the function of post-
axial religion is to create contexts within which [this] transformation ... can 
take place," "the basic criterion" by which religious systems must be assessed 
is "soteriological." (300) The extent to which religions succeed in effecting 
this transformation must be judged by the degree to which they succeed in 
embodying "the ethical ideal, common to all the great traditions of 
agape/karuna (love compassion)." (14) When we apply this criterion we find 
that "no one tradition stands out as more productive of sainthood than an-
other." (307) 
Are Hick's premises true? Are John Wesley's and D.T. Suzuki's transfor-
mations, for example, essentially the same? Only if the specifically Christian 
or Buddhist content of their religious lives are accidental to them. It is diffi-
cult to believe that they are. 
One can raise similar questions about the agape/karuna ideal. The golden 
rule is (as Hick argues) a common denominator in post-axial religion but how 
this is fleshed out varies. Even when ideals of saintliness are most alike, the 
content or flavor of love and compassion seems different. It isn't clear, for 
example, that the love of a St. Francis who believes that others are made in 
God's image and the compassion of a bodhisattva who believes that people 
are "empty" is in all important respects the same. 
Hick preserves his thesis by ascribing differences to the common ideal's 
being set in different historical contexts. But this seems problematic. 
Hick's interpretation of religion is driven by his conviction that the major 
traditions are equally authentic responses to the Real. This conviction is 
grounded in his belief that they are equally effective in producing salva-
tionfliberation. That belief, in tum, is supported by the claim that the major 
traditions come off equally well when assessed by their common ideal. That 
they have a common ideal, however, can only be defended by discounting 
differences. This is reasonable if and only if the major traditions are equally 
appropriate responses to the Real. But that is precisely what is at issue. 
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I am not sure, then, that Hick's interpretation of religion is ultimately 
persuasive. Nevertheless, this is a rich and rewarding book. It is also an 
important one. Hick has shown us why we should be concerned with the issue 
of religious pluralism and proposed a thoughtful solution; future work on the 
problem will have to take this book into account. I strongly recommend it. 
Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement: Philosophical and Theological Essays, 
ed. by Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. Notre Dame, Indi-
ana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989. Pp. xii + 236, $29.95. 
STEPHEN T. DAVIS, Claremont McKenna College 
This book contains the final versions of the papers from a conference that 
was held at Marquette University on April 14 - 16, 1988. It was an extraor-
dinary and well-attended gathering of both philosophers and theologians. The 
aim was to have them communicate with each other on three crucial topics 
in Christian theology, viz., Trinity, incarnation, and atonement. Those who 
attended the conference will remember being impressed at the uniformly high 
quality of the papers, at the energetic discussions they generated, and at the 
sense that something important was beginning. 
I am delighted to report that the book is excellent; it is a must reading for 
anybody who is interested in the theological topics that are considered-or, 
indeed, for anybody who is interested in the curious and unexpected recent 
movement of Christian philosophers writing about theology (about which I 
will say more later). The editors, both of whom are younger theologians of 
a Reformed persuasion, are to be commended both for their own fine essays 
and for the book as a whole. 
The philosophers and theologians who contribute to the book are all some-
what traditional or conservative in their approach to the Christian faith. By 
this I mean: (1) all of them take Christian tradition seriously; in their essays 
they deal with figures and issues many contemporary theologians ignore; (2) 
all appear to agree with Neal Plantinga's comment, "Theological theories 
ought to be drawn and elaborated from Scripture" (p. 23); and (3) all end up 
affirming (rather than rejecting as outmoded, mythological, or prescientific) 
at least some traditional theological formulations. 
There are three essays on the Trinity: "Social Trinity and Tritheism," by 
Neal Plantinga of Calvin Theological Seminary; "Trinitarian Personhood and 
Individuality" by David Brown of Oxford University; and "Trinity and Tran-
scendentals" by Norman Kretzmann of Cornell University. There are notice-
able commonalities among the three authors. First, each takes the classical 
doctrine of the Trinity seriously and tries to make sense of it in a robust and 
